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A CAUTIONARY TALE FROM THE
MULTIDISCIPLINARY PRACTICE DEBATE: HOW THE
TRADITIONALISTS LOST PROFESSIONALISM
Russell G. Pearce*
I dreamt I was in one of the nightmares Lawrence J. Fox, former chair of
the American Bar Association Committee on Ethics and Professional
Responsibility, and currently Visiting Professor at Cornell Law School, has so
articulately described in his writings and presentations. 1 In the dream, I was in
the year 2010 at the convention of the National Association of Multidisciplinary
Professional Firms2 (the "Association"). I had just finished making a
presentation on the topic, "How Can We Reconcile Our Pursuit of Profits With
Our Responsibility to Promote Justice?" My presentation was part of this year's
"Aaron Feuerstein Program" of the Association's Legal Services Section. It had
become common in the twenty-first century for business organizations to feature
"Aaron Feuerstein Programs" to explore their responsibility to the common
good in their business operations. The programs honor the example of Aaron
Feuerstein, owner of Malden Mills, the largest employer in Methuen,
Massachusetts.3 When a fire destroyed most of the Malden Mills facility in 1995,
Mr. Feuerstein passed up the opportunity to move his factory to a location where
he could pay his workers less and instead remained loyal to his workers and to
the community by rebuilding in Methuen.4
After the presentation, I joined the President of the Association for a drink.
We talked for a few minutes about two ethics exemplars from Massachusetts:
Aaron Feuerstein and Louis Brandeis. Brandeis, of course, had opined in the
early twentieth century that both lawyers and business people shared an
obligation to promote the common good in their work.5 In this sense, the
Feuerstein Program was the culmination of Brandeis's vision.
* Professor of Law and Associate Director, Louis Stein Center for Ethics and Law, Fordham
University School of Law. As usual, I am grateful to my friends and colleagues, Mary Daly, Matt
DiUller, and Bruce Green, for their insightful comments.
1. See Lawrence J. Fox, You've Got the Soul of the Profession in Your Hands, Written Remarks
of Lawrence J. Fox before the Multidisciplinary Practice Commission (visited Oct. 4, 1999)
<http://www.abanet.org/cpr/foxl.html> (describing "nightmare" future in which multidisciplinary
professional firms ignore concerns of legal profession).
2. I am using Larry Fox's terminology. See supra note 1 for Fox's description of his "nightmare"
involving this convention.
3. See David M. Herszenhorn, Plume of Hope Rises From Factory Ashes, N.Y. TIMEs, Dec. 16,
1995, at 8 (describing Feuerstein's relationship with Malden Mills and Methuen).
4. Id
5. See Louis D. BRANDEIS, Business-A Profession, in BusINEss-A PROFESSION 1-2 (1933)
(stating both business and law are professions).
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Larry Fox came by to say hello for a few minutes. After he left, the
President of the Association proposed a toast to Larry for his important
contribution to the multidisciplinary practice industry.
I was a bit surprised. "You must be mistaken," I responded. "There could
be no stronger and more articulate opponent of multidisciplinary practice than
Larry."
"Precisely," she answered. "Let me explain. In the late twentieth century,
the legal profession was generally divided into Reformers and Traditionalists, all
of whom sought to preserve professionalism in the face of new developments in
the market for legal services. The Traditionalists rejected any accommodation of
market forces to permit multidisciplinary businesses. They argued that allowing
multidisciplinary businesses would destroy professionalism by undermining
lawyers' independence, ethics, and pro bono commitment. 6 In contrast, the
Reformers sought to 'channel' market forces in an effort to protect the core
values of professionalism. 7 They were willing to permit multidisciplinary services
so long as lawyers' legal ethics rules continued to control the delivery of legal
services.8 If the Reformers had won any victories, we would have faced
significant competition and potential obstacles."
"For example," she continued, "in the early 1980s, the ABA's Kutak
Commission proposed amending the ethics rules to permit nonlawyers to hold a
'financial interest' or 'managerial authority' in organizations providing legal
services.9 The ABA rejected this proposal. 10 If it had accepted it, by the turn of
the century a number of lawyer-dominated multidisciplinary practice firms
("MDPs") would have been strong competitors of the accounting firms."
"Similarly," she noted, "at the end of the twentieth century, the ABA
Commission on Multidisciplinary Practice offered another reform. It proposed
that lawyers be permitted to participate in multidisciplinary service firms so long
as such firms were bound by the legal ethics rules, all clients of such firms were
treated as the lawyers' clients for purposes of the conflicts rules, and MDPs
6. See MDP House Debate, Annual Meeting 1999, Unedited Transcript, Reports 10A, 10B and
10C (1999) (visited Oct. 8, 1999) < http://www.abanet.org/cpr/mdphouse.html> (stating positions of
Lawrence J. Fox, John L. Curtin, Jr., Cheryl Niro, Thomas 0. Rice, Jerome J. Shestack, and Jack
Dunbar).
7. AJ. Noble, Accountants Watch. The ABA's Liberal Stance, AM. LAW., July 1999, at 52
(quoting then-ABA President Philip Anderson who stated "[miarket forces cannot be stopped...
[b]ut they can be channeled").
8. See, e.g., MDP House Debate, supra note 6 (stating positions of Sherwin P. Simmons, Philip S.
Anderson, Carolyn B. Lamm, and James P. Holden).
9. See CENTER FOR PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY, AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION, THE
LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCr: THEIR DEVELOPMENT
IN THE ABA HOUSE OF DELEGATES 159-60 (1987) (reprinting draft of Rule 5.4 proposed at February
1983 ABA meeting); see also Thomas R. Andrews, Nonlawyers in the Business of Law: Does the One
Who Has the Gold Really Make the Rules?, 40 HASTINGS L.J. 577, 593-96 (1989) (discussing proposal
and its rejection).
10. See CENTER FOR PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY, supra note 9, at 161-64 (showing deletion
of proposed rule and substitution of new Rule 5.4 prohibiting fee sharing between lawyers and
nonlawyers).
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controlled by nonlawyers were subject to regulation by the courts."11
She smiled. "Imagine the difficulty we would have had with the
Commission's proposals that the lawyers' conflicts rules apply to our firms and
that we submit to regulation by the courts. Thank goodness those proposals
were defeated. Their defeat left the organized bar without any coherent strategy
for influencing our entry into the legal services business."
"We continued as we had done before the Commission's proposals-
expanding our legal services business under the rubric of 'consulting' 12 and
ignoring the bar. By the turn of the century, multidisciplinary firms which had
begun as accounting firms included four of the five largest employers of lawyers
in the world. t3 They employed thousands of American lawyers14 and recruited
increasing numbers of partners from major law firms."'15
"While the Traditionalists were strong enough to defeat the Commission's
proposals," she noted, "they were not strong enough to lead an effective
campaign against us for violation of unauthorized practice statutes. In this
effort, the bar faced the formidable task of undoing what had become the status
quo. And if this hurdle was not enough, the Traditionalists could not unite the
bar behind their struggle. Some lawyers rejected the Traditionalists' approach as
a policy matter. Others were wary of alienating clients who favored the
development of multidisciplinary practice. But even if they could have united
the bar, the Traditionalists didn't have a compelling message for the public. The
cause of protecting lawyers' independence was not particularly popular with
people who didn't trust lawyers to police themselves or to promote the public
interest.' 16
"Now I hope you understand why I toast Larry Fox," she concluded.
"Without him, we might not have had the same freedom to develop our
industry."
11. MDP Report, Recommendation, 1 2, 4, 8, 14 (visited Oct. 8, 1999) <http://www.abanet.
orglcpr/mdprecommendation.html>.
12. See, e.g., Elizabeth MacDonald, Lawyers Protest Accounting Firms' Hiring, WALL ST. J., Aug.
22, 1997, at B8 (reporting that managing partner at Price Waterhouse described consulting on human
resources, benefits, and stock-option plans as "strictly advice, which doesn't constitute practicing
law").
13. See Philip S. Anderson, We All Must Be Accountable, A.B.A. J., Oct. 1998, at 6 (citing
statistic that "[o]nly one of the top five employers of the most lawyers is a law firm").
14. Exact figures are not readily available. In 1997, one journalist reported that three of the Big
Five employed more than 2000 tax attorneys between them. MacDonald, supra note 12, at B8. A
complete figure would include the non-tax attorneys at those firms, as well as all attorneys at the other
two members of the Big Five. Larry Fox has suggested that the total number is 5000. MDP House
Debate, supra note 6.
15. See, e.g., Tom Herman, Tax Report: A Special Summary and Forecast of Federal and State Tax
Developments, WALL ST. J., Nov. 11, 1998, at Al (reporting "high profile" partners at big firms are
leaving to join Big Five); P. Hann Livingston, Trophy Fishing with the Big Five, AM. LAw., Aug. 1999,
at 19 (listing "big-name ... big firm partners [who] have all signed on with the accounting firms").
16. Russell G. Pearce, Law Day 2050: Post-Professionalism, Moral Leadership, and the Law as
Business Paradigm, 27 FLA. ST. U. L. REv. 9, 9 n.4 (1999) (collecting polls demonstrating lack of
confidence in legal profession and "negative view of lawyers").
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I thought for a moment and then replied. "I too would like to toast Larry
Fox, but for a different reason. I was not part of either the Traditionalist or
Reformer camps. I opposed professionalism because it blocked equal access to
justice and undermined efforts to promote a commitment to the common good
among lawyers. 17 Nonetheless, I admired Larry and his opponents for their
passionate devotion to the ideal that lawyers should seek meaning in their work
from their special responsibility for the administration of justice. In that way,
despite today's new roles and new rules, Larry continues to be a role model for
all of us. I've got an idea. Why don't you consider him for next year's Aaron
Feuerstein Award?"
17. ld; Russell G. Pearce, The Professionalism Paradigm Shift. Why Discarding Professional
Ideology Will Improve the Conduct and Reputation of the Bar, 70 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1229 (1995).
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FOCUSING THE MDP DEBATE: HISTORICAL AND
PRACTICAL PERSPECTIVES
James W. Jones*
INTRODUCTION
I am delighted to have the opportunity to participate in this Symposium on
the changing roles of lawyers in modern American society and on the issues of
ethics and professionalism implicated in such changes. As the former managing
partner of a large law firm and presently, as an executive of a worldwide
professional services firm, I have spent a considerable part of my professional
life grappling with these issues.
During my tenure as a partner at Arnold & Porter, the firm established
three subsidiary consulting firms: APCO Associates, to provide public affairs
and government relations services; MPC & Associates, to offer real estate
development consulting services, principally to non-profit clients; and The
Secura Group, to provide consulting services to financial institutions. These
ancillary businesses1 were formed to complement established practices within the
law firm by making available the services of talented nonlawyer professionals to
supplement the legal services offered by the firm's attorneys. The first of the
subsidiaries, APCO Associates, was established in 1984, following a careful
review by the firm-and the District of Columbia Bar-to insure that the
business would be operated in a manner consistent with the rules of practice
imposed upon the lawyers of the firm.2 Although Arnold & Porter scrupulously
* James W. Jones is Vice Chairman and General Counsel of APCO Associates Inc., a global
public affairs, government relations, and strategic communications firm headquartered in Washington,
D.C. Prior to joining APCO in 1995, Mr. Jones was a partner in the Washington-based law firm of
Arnold & Porter and served as Managing Partner of that firm from 1986 through 1995.
1. The term "ancillary business" is the phrase used by the American Bar Association ("ABA")
to describe law-related services offered by a law firm. The term "law-related services" is defined in
the Model Rules as "services that might reasonably be performed in conjunction with and in substance
are related to the provision of legal services, and that are not prohibited as unauthorized practice of
law when provided by a nonlawyer." MODEL RULEs OF PROFESSIONAL CoNDUCr Rule 5.7(b) (1999).
2. The operational rules established by Arnold & Porter for its subsidiaries were quite restrictive.
First, all subsidiaries were held to the same ethical requirements in terms of conflicts, protections of
client confidences, advertising of services, etc., as applied to the law firm itself, and all questions
arising in this area were resolved by the law firm's Ethics and Practice Committee. Second, for
purposes of conflicts of interest screening, the subsidiaries and the law firm were considered to be one
and the same entity, and any potential conflicts that were identified were resolved by the Policy
Committee of the law firm. Third, all brochures and other promotional literature produced by the
subsidiaries were required to be cleared by the law firm's Ethics and Practice Committee, using
principles consistent with those applied in the legal profession. Finally, all promotional literature and
all retainer agreements used by the subsidiaries clearly disclosed the relationship of the subsidiaries to
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followed these rules for as long as it retained its subsidiaries, 3 it did not prevent
the firm's operation of ancillary businesses from becoming a subject of
considerable controversy.
By the late 1980s, dozens of other law firms throughout the country had
followed Arnold & Porter's example.4 Subsequently, there arose within the
ABA-particularly within the ABA's Section of Litigation-a chorus of
objections to law firms engaging in such ancillary business activities. Critics
charged that the operation of such subsidiaries by law firms led to irreconcilable
conflicts of interest, endangered client confidences and the sanctity of the
attorney-client privilege, and ran the risk of compromising the independence of
the professional judgment of lawyers participating in such activities.
During 1990 and 1991, I participated in the Working Group on Ancillary
Business Activities. This group was formed by the ABA's Special Coordinating
Committee on Professionalism to examine and make recommendations
concerning ancillary businesses for consideration by the Standing Committee on
Ethics and Professional Responsibility and for ultimate referral to the House of
Delegates. The process, inaugurated by the work of that committee, led
ultimately to the adoption by the House of Delegates of Rule 5.7 of the Model
Rules of Professional Conduct, which addresses the operation of ancillary
businesses by law firms.5
the law firm. This material specifically notified clients of the consulting groups that the services
provided by the subsidiaries were not legal services and that communications with the consulting
groups were not entitled to the protections of the attorney-client privilege. These disclosures also
made clear that no client of any of the consulting groups was required to use the services of Arnold &
Porter, or vice versa.
3. Arnold & Porter sold its interests in all three of its subsidiaries during the early 1990s: APCO
Associates was sold to Grey Advertising Inc. in 1991; MPC & Associates was sold to Sallie Mae in
1994; and The Secura Group was sold to Andersen Consulting in 1995.
4. A 1987 survey by the National Association of Law Firm Marketing Administrators found a
considerable number of ancillary businesses being operated by law firms of all sizes across the nation.
The diversity of these activities was quite impressive. The survey found, for example, law firms
engaged in investment banking in Atlanta and Memphis; energy and environmental consulting,
management services, and employer-benefits consulting in Atlanta; advertising in Arizona; labor-
relations consulting in Philadelphia; real estate brokering in Los Angeles; office support services,
seminars, and videos in Pittsburgh; real estate development services nationwide; and business
consulting services dealing with international trade in New York. The survey also found that in
Washington, D.C., law firms had spawned a great variety of nonlegal affiliates, ranging in
specialization from energy and environmental consulting to healthcare consulting and management,
from educational consulting to economic research and legislative services. See Phyllis Weiss Haserot,
Multiprofessional Mixes Are Proliferating, NAT'L U., Oct. 19, 1987, at 16.
5. The process by which the ABA's House of Delegates ultimately adopted the current Rule 5.7,
during its Midyear Meeting in early 1994, was quite tortuous. At its Annual Meeting in 1991, the
House of Delegates, specifically rejecting the recommendations of the ABA's Standing Committee on
Ethics and Professional Responsibility, narrowly adopted a version of Rule 5.7 that purported to
prohibit lawyers from engaging in any ancillary business activities outside of their law firms. See
SELECrED STATUTES, RULEs AND STANDARDS ON THE LEGAL PROFESSION 97 (John S. Dzienkowski
& Grace Whittenburg eds., West 1994) (reprinting former version of Rule 5.7). That action led to a
wave of protest around the country that resulted in the repeal of the prohibitory version of the rule at
the 1992 Annual Meeting of the House of Delegates, again by a narrow vote. Id. In November 1992,
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I review this history because I believe it relevant to the current debate now
underway in the ABA and in state bars throughout the country concerning
multidisciplinary practices ("MDPs"). 6 MDPs are, in a sense, merely the "flip
side" of ancillary businesses. In an ancillary business, lawyers typically hire and
control nonlawyer professionals who provide law-related services, primarily to
the lawyers' clients. By contrast, in an MDP, lawyers enter into arrangements
with nonlawyer professionals in which the lawyers may, in fact, work for and
report to the nonlawyers. Both cases, however, raise the same questions of
ethics and professionalism. Accordingly, the history and experience of the
ancillary business debate are relevant to the present inquiry.
Reflecting on the prior debate and on the rapidly changing environment in
which the current debate is occurring, I would like to offer four observations-
two in the nature of historical perspective and two related to the substance of the
current discussion.
HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVES
The first historical observation is that collaborations between lawyers and
nonlawyers are not a new phenomenon. In fact, for about as long as there have
been lawyers in this country, they have been engaged in a wide range of activities
beyond just the practice of law. For example:
* Many law firms in Massachusetts have operated trust companies for
almost a century, including some firms registered with the Securities
and Exchange Commission under the Investment Advisors Act of
1940.7
" For many years, title insurance has been sold in Connecticut by
entities organized and styled as law firms but which, in fact, have
the Chair of the House of Delegates appointed a special Committee on Ancillary Business to attempt
to construct an appropriate ABA position on the controversial issue. The result was the current
version of Rule 5.7 that was, as noted above, adopted in early 1994. Id.
6. For purposes of this discussion, I use the term "multidisciplinary practice" to refer to a
structure in which lawyers and nonlawyers join together to offer a combination of legal and non-legal
services through a single entity, typically with some sharing of fees and ownership interests. This
definition is essentially the same as that used by the ABA's Commission on Multidisciplinary Practice
(the "MDP Commission") in its August 1999 Report to the House of Delegates, which defined an
MDP as:
a partnership, professional corporation, or other association or entity that includes lawyers
and nonlawyers and has as one, but not all, of its purposes the delivery of legal services to a
client(s) other than the MDP itself or that holds itself out to the public as providing nonlegal,
as well as legal, services.... [An MDP] includes an arrangement by which a law firm joins
with one or more other professional firms to provide services, including legal services, and
there is a direct or indirect sharing of profits as part of the arrangement.
ABA Commission on Multidisciplinary Practice, MDP Final Report (visited Dec. 28, 1999)
<http://www.abanet.org/cpr/mdreport.htmil>.
7. ABA Special Coordinating Committee on Professionalism, Working Group, Final Report on
the Ancillary Business Activities of Lawyers and Law Firms 10 (Nov. 30, 1990). The following
observations are based, in part, on the author's participation in the ABA Special Coordinating
Committee, Working Group.
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engaged in no business other than the sale of title insurance.
" Real estate lawyers in dozens of jurisdictions across the country
routinely act as agents for title insurance companies.8
" Thousands of American lawyers also serve as real estate brokers,
life insurance agents, financial planners, accountants, and marriage
counselors.9
" For some twenty years, over 350 law firms have joined together in
the Attorneys Liability Assurance Society to provide malpractice
insurance through a company owned and controlled by member
firms. 10
These examples demonstrate that lawyers and nonlawyers in this country
have been engaged in business arrangements together for a very long time. For
better or worse, the American legal profession has never imposed the kind of
insulation--or isolation--on the practice of law that existed, at least until
recently, under the British barrister system or with the French avocats.
American lawyers, almost since the founding of the Republic, have combined the
practice of law with a host of other commercial and non-commercial activities.
They have also managed to sort through the ethical issues raised by such
combinations and, in the main, have done so with admirable skill and integrity.
This leads to my second historical observation. Notwithstanding the long
history of the involvement of lawyers in related and unrelated business activities,
the American legal profession-at least as represented by its formal organs, the
bars and bar associations-has always been quite resistant to any changes in the
practice of law. Such resistance has been especially true where a change
threatened to reorder well-established economic interests within the profession.
Numerous examples of this phenomenon might be cited:
" At the end of the last century, the emergence of the modern law
firm was condemned by many in the bar as the selling out of the
profession to crass commercial interests."
" Some years later, the development of in-house law departments by
American corporations was roundly criticized by many prominent
leaders of the bar as threatening the professional independence of
lawyers. 12
" In the 1930s, the introduction of group legal services plans
(primarily by labor unions and public service entities) to provide
affordable legal services to persons of low and moderate income was
vigorously attacked by the bar.13 The controversy was ultimately
resolved in a series of Supreme Court decisions in the 1960s and
early 1970s that the bar lost.14
8 Id.
9. Id. at 9.
10. Id. at 2-3.
11. Id. at 5.
12. Id.
13. Id. at 5 & n.10.
14. See United Transp. Union v. State Bar of Michigan, 401 U.S. 576,585 (1971) (holding right to
[Vol. 72
FOCUSING THE MDP DEBATE
* In the 1970s, the introduction of paralegals, in-house investigators,
and other paraprofessionals was challenged by many as amounting
to the unauthorized practice of law.
* More recently, the proliferation of legal self-help books-and now
on-line services-has been attacked by many bars as the
unauthorized practice of law and a dangerous threat to the public. 15
" The debate within the profession in the late 1980s and early 1990s
concerned ancillary businesses, a phenomenon that the ABA's
Section of Litigation described as "one of the most important
[crises] to ever face the American legal profession.' 6
These examples reflect that virtually every innovation in the practice of law
over the past one hundred years has been, at least initially, criticized and often
roundly condemned by the organized bar. In my view, the current debate over
MDPs fits the same pattern. Yet, despite the naysayers and the prophets of
doom-and there have been many-I think that the American legal profession is
better and stronger today because of the changes described above.
SUBSTANTIVE COMMENTS
Against this historical background, I offer two substantive observations on
the subject of MDPs. The first relates to the historic changes in the delivery of
legal services described above. Almost all of the changes previously mentioned
were driven, in one way or another, by client demands for more efficient and
cost-effective legal services. The same is true of MDPs as well.
Critics of MDPs are fond of saying that clients are not asking for these
services and that the whole phenomenon has been created by the Big Five
accounting firms to generate a new line of business. At one level, it may be true
that clients do not frequently ask for MDPs per se-particularly because they are
not currently permitted in this country. Clients do, however, increasingly
demand efficient, timely, comprehensive, and cost-effective services of all of
their professional service providers. If MDPs are one way of delivering such
services-at least in some areas of legal practice-there is no reason that clients
seek collective legal action through cooperative union of workers is protected by First and Fourteenth
Amendments); Brotherhood of R.R. Trainmen v. Virginia State Bar, 377 U.S. 1, 8 (1964) (holding
union's program of advising injured workers to seek legal advice and making referrals to counsel is
protected under First and Fourteenth Amendments); NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 437 (1963)
(holding Virginia law prohibiting solicitation of business for attorney violated First and Fourteenth
Amendments).
15. See Unauthorized Practice of Law Committee v. Parsons Tech., Inc., No. 3:97-CV-2859-H,
1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 813, at *18 (N.D. Tex. Jan. 22, 1999) (holding software program providing legal
forms to users violates state statute prohibiting unauthorized practice of law). This case was
subsequently vacated and remanded when the Texas legislature amended its statute to provide that
the practice of law does not include "the design, creation, publication... display or sale... [of]
computer software, or similar products if the products clearly and conspicuously state that the
products are not a substitute for the advice of an attorney." Unauthorized Practice of Law Committee
v. Parson Tech., Inc., 179 F.3d 956, 956 (5th Cir. 1999).
16. ABA Section of Litigation, Report with Recommendations to the House of Delegates, 1991
Annual Meeting, Report, at 37 (1991).
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should not be offered the choice of an MDP as one means of meeting their
needs.
Having said that, I would also note that the experience and success of the
Big Five in offering MDP and MDP-like services in countries around the world
provide considerable evidence of the client demand for such services. In
September 1999, the Financial Times reported on a survey of several hundred
major corporations in Europe and the United States in which purchasers of legal
services (general counsels, CFOs, and others) were asked about their willingness
to use MDPs. The survey found that more than half of the respondents in
Europe and the United States said they would consider using MDPs for certain
kinds of legal services; among financial institutions in the United States, the
number rose to seventy-five percent. 17 It is also significant that the MDP
concept has been endorsed by the American Corporate Counsels Association,
the organization that represents the major corporate purchasers of legal services
in this country. 18
The client demand for MDPs, however, is not limited to major corporate
purchasers of legal services. MDPs have great promise to enhance the practices
of solo and small firm practitioners and to facilitate the delivery of needed legal
services to important under-served populations. For this reason, the MDP
concept was endorsed in statements before the MDP Commission by
representatives of the American Association of Retired Persons ("AARP"), 19
the Consumer Alliance, 20 the ABA's Standing Committee on the Delivery of
Legal Services,21 and the ABA's General Practice, Solo and Small Firm
Section.22 A number of practitioners representing the elderly, disabled, and
disadvantaged have also embraced the MDP concept. 23
Simply put, the use of MDPs comes down to a matter of clients' freedom of
choice. As noted in the statement of the Consumer Alliance submitted to the
MDP Commission:
17. Jim Kelly, Big Five: Long Arm of the Law, FIN. TIMES, Sept. 9, 1999, at 29, available in
<http://www.ft.com/lhippocampus>.
18. See American Corporate Counsel Association, Multidisciplinary Practice (visited Dec. 28,
1999) <http://www.acca.com/gcadvocate/multi.html>.
19. See Letter from Wayne Moore, J.D., Director, Legal Advocacy Group, AARP, to the
Commission on Multidisciplinary Practice, Center for Professional Responsibility, American Bar
Association (July 27,1999) (visited Dec. 28, 1999) <http://www.abanet.org/cpr/consumer2.html>.
20. See Letter from the Consumer Alliance Community to the MDP Commission (July 15, 1999)
(visited Dec. 28,1999) <http://www.abanet.org/cpr/consumer2.html>.
21. See John S. Skilton, Chair, ABA Standing Committee on the Delivery of Legal Services,
Written Testimony before the MDP Commission (Aug. 8, 1999) (visited Dec. 28, 1999)
<http://www.abanet.org/cpr/skilton.html>.
22. See Larry Ramirez, Chair, General Practice, Solo and Small Firm Section, Oral Remarks
before the MDP Commission (Feb. 1999) (visited Dec. 28, 1999) <http://www.abanet.org/
cpr/skilton.htnil>.
23. See, e.g., Charles F. Robinson, Solo Practitioner, Oral Remarks before the MDP Commission
(Feb. 1999) (visited Dec. 28, 1999) <http://www.abanet.org/cpr/robinson.html>; Philip Matthew
Stinson, Sr., Statement Before the MDP Commission (Oct. 9, 1999) (visited Dec. 28, 1999)
<http://www.abanet.org/cpr/stinson.html>.
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In most products or services they buy, consumers want choices. Choice
is the backbone of America's free enterprise, competitive business
community. By allowing lawyers to partner with other types of
professionals, every consumer could choose the method of service that
best suits his or her needs. Not every consumer will want to consult a
multidisciplinary practice that includes a lawyer-but all consumers
would benefit from having that option and we believe that lawyers will
benefit as well.24
This strong consumer interest in MDPs was also confirmed by the Reporter
of the MDP Commission, Professor Mary C. Daly, in the following terms:
The Commission heard strong testimony from business clients,
representatives of consumer groups, and ABA entities that amending
the Model Rules to permit fee sharing and partnership and other
association with a nonlawyer is in the best interest of the public. Of
particular significance to the Commission was the view of the Council
of the ABA General Practice, Solo and Small Firm Section, noting the
need for multidisciplinary counseling of individual and business clients
and the inefficiencies in attempting to satisfy that need through the
coordinated advice of professionals in nonaffiliated firms. The ethics
counsel to the Arizona State Bar told the Commission that she has
received a substantial number of inquiries from lawyers in Arizona
expressing an interest in forming a partnership with a nonlawyer. An
informal survey of the opinions of state bar association ethics
committees issued over the course of the past ten years indicates that
the overwhelming majority of the inquiries on this subject appear to
have been submitted by lawyers in solo or small firms.25
It thus seems apparent that the interest in MDPs is not limited to large
corporate clients and that the MDP phenomenon cannot be dismissed as simply
a marketing ploy of the Big Five accounting firms. Moreover, it must be noted
that opponents of the MDP concept who raise the client demand question are
really dragging a red herring across the trail of this debate. If, in fact, there is no
genuine client demand for this new form of service delivery, then the effort to
create MDPs will ultimately fail-presumably to the delight of critics-
notwithstanding what the Big Five might do. If, however, the demand is
genuine, then we lawyers-as providers of professional services intended to
serve the interests of our clients-should permit the evolution of MDPs, unless
to do so would create a serious threat to the public interest.26
Opponents of MDPs have raised a number of public interest concerns that
can and should be addressed in the context of the current debate. These
concerns include issues of potential conflicts of interest, client confidences and
the maintenance of the attorney-client privilege, and the preservation of the
independence of lawyers' professional judgment. In my view, however, none of
24. The Consumer Alliance, Written Remarks to the MDP Commission (Mar. 31, 1999) (visited
Dec. 28,1999) <http://www.abanet.org/cpr/multicom.html>.
25. ABA Commission on Multidisciplinary Practice, MDP Final Report, Appendix C, Reporter's
Notes (visited Dec. 28,1999) <http://www.abanet.orglepr/mdpappendixc.html>.
26. Note I said the public interest and not the interests of the legal profession.
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these issues raise questions that are unique to MDPs. They are all issues that
arise in the ordinary practice of law, particularly in large, multi-office or
international firms. The potential ethical problems raised by MDPs are, in other
words, no different in kind or degree from the sorts of issues that lawyers deal
with every day.
In his statement to the MDP Commission, Professor Robert Gordon of the
Yale Law School stated the issue succinctly:
Any and all forms of professional practice are subject to pressures,
constraints and temptations-pressures from hierarchical superiors or
peers, payment systems or fee arrangements, incentives to career
advancement or financial reward inside firms or in the profession
generally-that may to a greater or lesser extent compromise the
exercise of a lawyer's independent judgment. Over the course of this
century, the legal profession has adopted many arrangements and
organizational forms for representing clients and receiving payment for
services that pose conflicts between their own interests on the one
hand and the interests of clients and the public good on the other.
Hourly billing, to take one of many examples, tempts some lawyers to
run the meter, churn cases, and pad bills; contingent fees, to take
another, tempts others to shirk on effort, and settle early and low.
Such conflicts are unavoidable: No set of arrangements has ever been
or ever will be devised that will entirely remove such pressures and
temptations. The question your Commission has to ask is, Do the
proposed arrangements for lawyers to practice with nonlawyers
promise to add any significant sources of pressure, constraint and
temptation to those that already exist? And even [if] the answer to
that question should turn out to be Yes (or Maybe), does the likely
cost or risk of adding new sources of pressure offset the likely benefits
of multi-disciplinary practices?27
After reviewing the issues presented, Professor Gordon concluded that no case
has been made that MDPs pose any additional risks that should be used to justify
their prohibition.28
To elaborate further on this point, one should consider the issue of
professional independence. The current prohibitions on nonlawyer ownership of
law firms and on fee splitting with nonlawyers set out in Rule 5.4 of the Model
Rules are justified on the grounds that to permit such activities would run the
risk of compromising the independence of the professional judgment of the
lawyers involved.29 Underlying this argument is the assumption that if a lawyer
is answerable to a shareholder who is a nonlawyer, or if a lawyer shares fees with
a nonlawyer, there is an overwhelming risk that the lawyer's professional
judgment could be swayed by his own economic interests or by other improper
considerations.
27. Letter from Robert W. Gordon, Professor of Law, Yale Law School, to Sherwin P. Simmons,
Esq., Chair, MDP Commission (May 21, 1999) (visited Dec. 28, 1999) <httpjl/www/abanet.org/
cpr/gordon.html> [hereinafter Gordon letter].
28. 1d
29. See MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCr Rule 5.4 (1999).
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The problem with the above-described argument is that the bar has already
recognized and approved situations in which lawyers may work for, and even be
supervised and compensated entirely by, nonlawyers without compromising their
professional integrity or judgment. Prime examples include in-house counsel,
government lawyers, legal services attorneys, and insurance company lawyers
who represent insureds and beneficiaries. Moreover, the bar has recognized that
even in the most serious of litigation matters---criminal trials-individual lawyers
may competently represent defendants even when the lawyers are employed and
supervised by the very government agency that has undertaken the prosecutions.
Officers in the military's Judge Advocate General Corps are good examples of
the latter, as are lawyers working in public defender services.
From both a logical and practical standpoint, it is difficult to square these
examples with the flat prohibition on partnerships and fee splitting with
nonlawyers set out in Rule 5.4, at least if the justification for the rule is the
preservation of lawyers' professional independence. As Professor Geoffrey
Hazard of the University of Pennsylvania Law School noted:
These financial relationship rules are obsolete. They disregard the fact
that many respected lawyers are in-house counsel-whose 'fees' come
from organizations owned by nonlawyers. How is it that a lawyer
whose entire income is dispensed by nonlawyers can be an honorable
member of the bar, but a lawyer who derives income with an
accountant or MBA is beyond the pale?30
Moreover, whatever pressures that a lawyer in an MDP might feel, can we
really believe that pressures on lawyers in major law firms are not just as great?
Do we believe that senior partners never encourage younger lawyers to mold
opinions in ways that are more to the liking of a major client? Or do we think
that the hourly billing system--or, more significantly, contingent fee
arrangements-do not create built-in conflict situations between lawyers'
economic interests and the interests of their clients? If anything, one could
argue that these pressures found within law firms are more insidious because
they are less obvious.
In addressing the fee splitting prohibition in Rule 5.4 within the context of
other activities currently permitted by the Model Rules, Yale's Professor Robert
Gordon put the case as follows:
The point is simply that lawyers already experience many forms of
pressure and constraint on their independent judgment. The case
against multi-disciplinary practice would have to be that it would
impose additional pressures and constraints, quantitatively and
qualitatively more severe in kind and degree, to those that already
exist. I am, however, unaware of any empirical support for the position
that a lawyer who shares fees with a nonlawyer is more likely to
subordinate the exercise of his independent professional judgment to
the pursuit of profit than a lawyer who shares fees only with other
lawyers. Indeed, the universal acceptance of in-house corporate
30. Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr., Lawyers and Accountants Must Make It Work, NAT'L LJ., Jan. 11,
1999, at A28.
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counsel provides a contrary example. Of course, some witnesses
before the Commission have pointed out, the nonlawyer employer of a
corporate counsel is also the client, and thus the client remains the
focus of the lawyer's attention-though even this is not entirely true, as
for example when an in-house lawyer for an insurer represents
policyholders as well as his company. But the issue is not merely
whether the lawyer will act for the benefit of the client, but whether the
lawyer will exercise his own best independent judgment for the benefit
of his client. The fact that the employer is also the client increases
rather than decreases the likelihood that a corporate in-house lawyer
could be swayed to subordinate his own independent professional
judgment about how to advise the client-employer to the client-
employer's own profit-driven judgment.31
What should be clear from the foregoing discussion is that the only effective
line of defense for preserving the professional independence of lawyers is the
integrity of the individual lawyer himself. If the bar is truly concerned about
such issues-and I would certainly hope it would be-it should focus on making
certain that individual lawyers have the training and the procedures for making
principled decisions when called upon in particular situations. I suggest,
however, that such training and procedures have little to do with the kind of
organization that employs an attorney. Indeed, a persuasive argument can be
made that the bar's ability to support and enforce the independence of lawyers'
professional judgment would be enhanced, not diminished, by a repeal of the
financial relationship provisions of Rule 5.4.
Under the present rule, by insisting that lawyers can practice law only in
traditional law firm settings, we effectively force out of the profession lawyers
who want to offer their services in non-traditional ways. As a consequence, we
compel such expatriates to characterize the services they provide as something
other than "legal services" and we exclude such offerings from the bar's ethical
and disciplinary system.32 I believe that yields a bad result-for the bar, for the
individual lawyers, and for the public. Our goal should be just the opposite: to
make it possible for all lawyers to practice their profession without regard to the
economic or organizational structure of the entity for which they work and,
having done that, to assert the ethical jurisdiction of the bar over all lawyers
whenever they hold themselves out as offering legal services.
31. Gordon letter, supra note 27.
32. I am, of course, aware that the bar from time to time attempts to assert its control over such
activities through its enforcement of prohibitions on the unauthorized practice of law. However, such
efforts have been largely ineffective, both because of limited bar resources and because of numerous
adverse court decisions. Moreover, it is somewhat anomalous that the bar should rely on
unauthorized practice restrictions-which were, after all, designed to protect the consuming public
from lay practitioners and others deemed incompetent to practice-to regulate persons trained as
lawyers (many of whom are extremely well qualified and experienced) but who elect to offer their
services in ways not sanctioned by the bar's highly restrictive organizational rules.
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CONCLUSION
I agree strongly with the conclusion and first recommendation of the ABA's
MDP Commission that:
The legal profession should adopt and maintain rules of professional
conduct that protect its core values, independence of professional
judgment, protection of confidential client information, and loyalty to
the client through avoidance of conflicts of interest, but should not
permit existing rules to unnecessarily inhibit the development of new
structures for the more effective delivery of services and better public
access to the legal system.33
In that context, I do not believe that the introduction of MDPs will mark
the "end of the legal profession as we know it." The sky is not falling here, any
more than it did at the introduction of law firms in the 1890s, of corporate law
departments in the 1920s, of group legal services plans in the 1930s, or of
ancillary businesses in the early 1990s. What MDPs do represent is the latest in a
series of developments-going back over one hundred years-that were all
essentially market-driven and designed to make legal services more accessible,
more efficient, and more cost effective.
In examining the ethical and professionalism issues raised by opponents of
MDPs, I find no compelling evidence that permitting lawyers to practice through
MDPs will add any additional pressures or constraints that are unlike those
already faced by lawyers in their everyday practices. Consequently, I do not
believe that MDPs will pose any additional risks to the independence of
professional judgment for the lawyers participating in them.
In conclusion, I believe that the profession-and, more importantly, its
clients-would be well-served by the amendment of Rule 5.4 of the Model Rules
(and the corresponding provisions of the rules of the various state bars) to
permit the creation of fully-integrated MDPs.
33. ABA Commission on Multidisciplinary Practice, MDP Final Report to the House of
Delegates, Recommendation (visited Dec. 28, 1999) <http://www.abanet.org/cpr/
mdprecommendation.html>.
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